What are the effects of a mobilized party base on elections? I present a new behavioral measure of the enthusiasm gap in a set of American elections to identify how the turnout rate of the party faithful varies across different contexts. I find that the advantaged party can see its registrants turn out by four percentage points more than the disadvantaged party in some elections, and that this effect can be even larger in competitive House districts. I estimate the net benefit to party vote share of the mobilized base, which is around one percentage point statewide, and up to one and one half points in competitive House contests. These results suggest that the partisan characteristics of an election have consequences not just for vote choice, but for the composition of the electorate.
1 "Gallup has found that voting enthusiasm generally relates to the eventual election outcome in midterm and presidential election years. In election years in which one party has a clear advantage on enthusiasm, that party tends to fare better in the midterm elections or win the presidential election." Frank Newport, "Republicans Less Enthusiastic About Voting in 2012," December 8, 2011, Gallup.com, retrieved at http://www.gallup.com/ poll/151403/republicans-less-enthusiastic-voting-2012.aspx.
2 As the New York Times editorial concluded following the 2010 midterm elections, when the Republicans picked up 63 House seats and six Senate seats, the Republicans "had succeeded in turning out their base, and . . . the Democrats had failed to rally their own (Editorial, "Election 2010 ," New York Times, November 3, 2010 ." 3 The Bush-Cheney 2004 reelection campaign made a widely-publicized decision to focus more of its resources on turning out the conservative base than persuading swing voters. Strategists Matthew Dowd and Karl Rove determined that seven percent or fewer of presidential voters were truly persuadable, and so 2004 could be won through a more effective mobilization strategy ("Karl Rove -The Architect," PBS Frontline, April 2005, http://www.pbs.org/ wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/architect/rove/2004.html).
2 to effect change.
Despite the potential importance of differential mobilization between partisan bases in the electorate suggested by both practitioners and scholars, we lack good measures of the size and effect of a mobilized party base. The Gallup measure of the enthusiasm gap is based on answers to survey questions not directly related to actual turnout or vote share. 4 Political science measures tend to estimate the effects of specific party activities (Caldeira and Patterson 1982 , Holbrook and McClurg 2005 , Masket 2009 , McGhee and Sides 2011 , or the effect of changes in overall turnout separate from partisanship (e.g., DeNardo 1980 , Erikson 1995 , Nagel and McNulty 1996 , Citrin, Schickler, and Sides 2003 , Martinez and Gill 2005 . These studies do not, however, estimate the magnitude of the change in composition of the electorate due to a mobilized base. Nor is the net effect of that mobilized base on election outcomes identified. I present here an effort to do both.
In this essay, I offer a new behavioral measure of changes in partisan turnout from statewide voter files to connect partisanship and participation. I adopt the term enthusiasm gap to characterize this measure. Put simply, I measure the difference in turnout in a single election between Democrats and Republicans who would normally turn out to vote at the same rate. This behavioral measure of the enthusiasm gap offers three distinct advantages. First, the behavioral measure is more closely related than other measures to the theoretical idea that in some elections, one party is advantaged by the motivation of its core supporters in the electorate. Second, the millions of observations in the statewide voter file characterizing the entire electorate allow me to estimate how the enthusiasm gap varies across U.S. House districts and the varying level of salience of these contests. This allows me to measure the extent to which differential gaps in partisan turnout occur concurrently across districts, due to national tides for example, or if they vary with the effort and context of the contest in each House district. Third, I estimate the effect of the changes in partisan turnout on vote shares, providing a measure of how a "good year" for one party influences vote share through the turnout choices of the party base.
Using the records of registered voters from state voter files and respondents to election surveys in Florida in election years 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010, I find that the turnout of partisan registrants who would normally vote at similar rates can vary with partisanship by up to four percentage points across the electorate, and more so in competitive House races. I find that this differential turnout can influence statewide vote share by close to one percent, and vote share in competitive House contests by up to one and one half percent. I believe the estimates on vote share to be conservative.
I find that differential turnout benefitted Democrats in 2006 , and Republicans in 2004 and 2010. I also find variation in the size of the enthusiasm gap by the competitiveness of the House contest, providing evidence that partisan turnout is to a measurable degree a function of the local campaign environment and not solely national tides.
I proceed by first presenting an example and definition of the enthusiasm gap, formally defining its measurement, presenting data sources and estimation, presenting estimates for statewide enthusiasm gaps in four elections and estimates by House district competitiveness in two midterms, and concluding with estimates of the net benefit to partisan vote share of the enthusiasm gap in each election.
Factors of differential partisan participation
As an initial example of the enthusiasm gap in practice, consider the rates of turnout by party of registration presented in 
The basic model
My definition of the enthusiasm gap is similar to the short-term forces that Converse and others contrast to the long-term component of the vote choice , Converse 1966 To illuminate, I plot hypothetical turnout curves in Figure 1 . On the x-axis, I plot the latent propensity to vote, and on the y-axis I plot the actual rate of turnout for citizens of that propensity in that election. Lines connect the actual turnout for simulated Republicans and Democrats across latent propensity to vote. While latent propensity to vote is a strong predictor of actual turnout, with explanatory power much greater than partisanship, I have plotted elections with four different hypothetical enthusiasm gaps. In the first election, in the top left frame, registered Democrats are on average 2.5 percentage points more likely to vote than registered Republicans of the same propensity to vote. The observed turnout for Democrats represented by the dashed line is almost always higher than the observed turnout for Republicans. In the second election, however, Republicans benefit from a larger enthusiasm gap, averaging 5 percentage points. In the third election, in the bottom left frame, there is no enthusiasm gap and the two lines are close to each other at all 7 points. Finally, the enthusiasm gap need not apply evenly across the electorate, as I have simulated in the election in the bottom right frame, where Democrats benefit from an enthusiasm gap at low propensities to vote, but neither party benefits at higher propensities. Other patterns are, of course, possible. The enthusiasm gap for the entire electorate is the average difference in turnout between
Democrats and Republicans given their propensities to vote, weighted by the number of registrants at each propensity.
Effect of the Enthusiasm Gap on Election Outcomes
In to come to the polls in the absence of the enthusiasm gap. This could be because they were marginal partisans (Campbell 1960 , DeNardo 1980 who are less likely to turn out than strong partisans , or that they are less interested in politics or have lower education (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, Rosenstone and Hansen 2003) . But, marginal partisans and less- Note: The enthusiasm gap is the space between the dashed and solid lines at each propensity to vote. In the first frame, I have simulated turnout when the Democrats benefit from an average enthusiasm gap of 2.5 percentage points. In the second frame, the Republicans benefit from an average enthusiasm gap of 5.0 percentage points. In the third frame, neither party benefits from a gap, and in the fourth frame, the Democrats benefit from an enthusiasm gap at low propensities to vote, but no gap at higher propensities. (Zaller 1992 , Zaller 2004 
Measuring the Enthusiasm Gap
I turn now to a measure of the enthusiasm gap using observations from statewide voter files. Voter files are the official record of turnout managed by state election officials, which match registered citizens to their individual history of turnout. For each registrant, the file records their history of turnout going back some number of elections, along with demographic and other characteristics.
The enthusiasm gap is the difference in turnout in a single election between Democrats and
Republicans who would normally turn out to vote at the same rates. Formally, let the propensity to vote for individual i in election j, y ij , be a function of individual characteristics x i through the function f j (x i ). So that the relationship between individual characteristics and propensity to vote need not be fixed in every election, I index f j by election. The turnout observed for individual i in election j, t ij , is the realization of an experiment with latent turnout y ij plus an enthusiasm effect, ξ ij , which may or may not have expected value zero, and a stochastic error ij specific to individual i in election j identically and independently distributed across individuals and elections with expected value zero. Thus the turnout choice is a function of the long-term component, y ij , and the short-term components ξ ij and ij . This yields the data-generating equations
The enthusiasm gap, γ j , is the average difference in the size of ξ ij between members of partisan groups. This difference can be measured from the observed data through a difference-in-difference in turnout relative to the propensity to vote. Let the variable G i measure group membership. In the binary case with parties G ∈ [0, 1], the enthusiasm gap is
where 1(G i = g) returns the value of one when G i is g, that is individual i is a member of partisan group g, and zero otherwise. Note that averaging across individuals cancels out the stochastic error ij , leaving remaining difference attributable to the average of the ξ ij by party.
Because propensity to vote, y ij , is a latent quantity not observed directly, I estimate propensity to vote using characteristics from voter files for each registrant in each election using a regression Results from voter files 12 The procedure presented here could be replicated in other states, and is most effective with large sample sizes and quality vote history records, as in Florida. 13 For each of these elections, I construct propensity to vote from a least-squares regression model of turnout from the prior election of the same type (2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006, respectively) . I present the coefficients from these models in Appendix Tables A1 through A4 . Using alternative statistical models, such as logit or classification trees, yields similar results.
14 I round to tenths all aggregations to propensity to vote. In addition to the election-level estimate of the enthusiasm gap, the frames of Figure 2 indicate from what segments of the voting electorate the enthusiasm gap is more and less relevant. 17 The 15 Note that I have not assumed that Democrats and Republicans do not have different underlying propensities to vote. Instead, the enthusiasm gap is the difference in turnout between Democrats and Republicans with the same propensity to vote. My estimate of the propensity accounts for prior differences in turnout between Democrats and Republicans. The evidence in Figure 3 suggests that the enthusiasm gap is due to the competitive nature of local contests and not solely to statewide forces favoring one of the two parties operating across all districts. More broadly, I have measured the size and effect of the enthusiasm gap in recent Florida elections. In some elections, registered Democrats are more likely to vote than registered
Republicans of the same underlying propensity to vote, while in others Republicans are more likely.
Overall, these gaps correlate with the partisan victor in each election and are suggestive evidence that the composition of the electorate influences which party wins. But turnout by registration is not the full story, as registering with a political party does not mean one votes for candidates from that party with probability of one. In the next section, I merge vote rates to the turnout rates to more accurately assess the effect of the enthusiasm gap on vote shares received.
Effect of the Enthusiasm Gap on Election Outcomes
In The dependent variable is coded one for a Democratic vote, and zero for Republican and other-party votesit is not a two-party only model because the vote probabilities here should reflect the full set of choices that voters considered. 22 The Cooperative Congressional Election Studies are fielded by YouGov Polimetrix using internet interviews. There was no CCES in 2004. CCES samples are constructed by first drawing a target population sample. This sample is based on the Census American Community Surveys and Current Population Survey Voting and Registration Supplements. The target sample is representative of the general population on a broad range of characteristics including a variety of geographic (state, region, metropolitan statistical area) and demographic (age, race, income, education, gender) measures. A stratified sample of individuals from YouGov Polimetrix's opt-in panel is invited to participate in each study. Those who completed the survey were then matched to the target sample based on the variables listed in parentheses above. For more detailed information on this type of survey and sampling technique see Vavreck and Rivers (2008) . All analysis presented in this paper uses the sampling weights provided with each Study. The effects of the enthusiasm gap on outcomes are less than the magnitude of the effect on Why are the estimated effects on vote share relatively modest? It is first important to note that these effects are limited to the subset of the population registered with one of the major parties.
Part of the overall change in party vote across election is due to changes in turnout and vote choice for other registrants. These effects, however, are the product of the increase (decrease) in turnout across the population of Democratic registrants and the probability that those registrants who voted because of the enthusiasm gap, given their characteristics, would vote for the Democratic candidate. Because I impute vote choice based on variables from the voter file, one concern is that my limited number of explanatory variables and specification error may attenuate predicted vote rate toward 50 percent, thus understating the true effect of the change in turnout on the vote share.
Given this concern, one might conclude that a 1.5 point effect in the House contests that become competitive is not insignificant, and could be the difference in close elections. The results suggest that partisan influences on turnout can have consequences on which party's candidates win close elections.
Discussion
I have estimated that the differential mobilization of party bases across American elections can be of modest but measurable size. In some elections, otherwise similar Democrats are more likely to turn out than Republicans by a few percentage points, while in others, the Republicans are more likely to participate. My interpretation is that a few percentage points is not surprisingly large, but could potentially be the difference in close elections, especially in close districts across the nation.
I find that local campaign context is centrally related to the size of the enthusiasm gap and to the effect of changes in turnout on party vote shares. This suggests that much of the enthusiasm gap may be the salience, excitement, or campaign activity surrounding competitive contests. It also suggests that those interested in increasing participation might find increasing competitive elections a route to do so.
More broadly, I have presented evidence that confirms that individual partisanship is related to the turnout choice in a way that varies across elections. I believe this to be one of the first 22 empirical efforts to provide such evidence. Converse describes the assumption that most scholars have followed on the matter:
"[I]n some instances strong partisan forces affect the turnout of different classes of identifiers, increasing the turnout of the advantaged party . . . However, these instances are rarer than is commonly assumed, and it is a convenience to treat patterns of turnout . . . independently of partisan variation (Converse 1966, p. 19) ."
It may be useful to begin to relax this assumption in our analysis of turnout, partisanship, and vote choice. 
